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INTRODUCTION 
The present study demonstrates a probabilistic 
approach to quantify the prolifertion risks of fuel leasing 
and recycling. A Markov model approach is applied to 
evaluate the probability of proliferation success by 
diversion or thefl. Proliferation risk is calculated as a 
product of the probability of success and the 
corresponding consequences. 
MARKOV MODEL OF FUEL CYCLES 
The Markov chain method has the capability to 
account for the dynamic features of proliferation [I, 2,3] 
In the Markov model approach, which follows the 
methodology developed by an international panel [4], the 
normal flows of nuclear material in the fuel cycle are 
accounted for and the abnormal flow due to proliferation 
activities or thefl are modeled as a time dependent 
random process. 
The evaluation of the proliferation success 
probability accounts for both intrinsic (technical 
difficulties, such as radiation) and exhinsic (safeguards) 
haniers to proliferation. 
The consequence of proliferation is represented by a 
material type index (Mn with values between 0 and 1) 
and it is related to the type of material that has been 
diverted or stolen. A larger index implies the material has 
a higher potential for weapons use and thus the 
proliferation would pose more risk. 
Scenario 1 
(OC-NL) 
Scenario 2 
(OC-L) 
Scenario 3 
(CC-NL) 
The characteristics of the fuel cycle scenarios are 
summarized in Table 1. Each scenario considers the fuel 
cycle in two types of states and the fuel leasing 
m g e m e n t  between states (countries). Type 1 states 
include weapon states (fuel suppliers). Other states with 
certain nuclear facilities belong to the Type 2 states (fuel 
recipients). These fuel cycles are similar to those studied 
previously by Reis et al. [SI who evaluated proliferation 
concerns by assessing the global inventory of weapons 
useable fissile material under different fuel cycle and 
leasing scenarios. In conmt, the current study applies a 
model that enables systematic evaluation of safeguards 
approaches and different design options with regard to 
proliferation resistance. 
Scenario 1 represents the so-called business as usual 
scenario, namely open fuel cycle and no lease of fuel 
between the two types of state (OC-NL). Scenario 2 is a 
variation of the previous one and it considers fuel leasing 
in an open fuel cycle environment, (OC-L). Both fuel 
cycles in Scenarios 3 (closed cycle no lease, CC-NL) and 
4 (closed cycle with lease, CC-L) are closed cycles where 
recycle facilities are present. 
proliferator and the target nuclear material can be 
obtained from both Type 1 states and Type 2 states (itself 
andor other Type 2 states). The acquisition of material 
from a Type 2 host state is a diversion and the acquisition 
of material h m  Type 1 states or other Type 2 states is 
actually a thefl, which should be more difficult to succeed 
than a diversion. 
In this study, one of the Type 2 states is the 
No Open Open LWR# LWR 
Supplier Recipient Open Open LWR LWR 
No 
LWR& LWR Closed (PmO I61 Closed FUREX) & W X +  171) ABR# No NO 
Table 1. Chhcteristics of Fuel Cycles Modeled by Markov Approach 
Scenario 4 
(CC-L) LWR& LWR ABR Open 
Closed (PYRO & 
W X + )  Supplier Recipient 
RESULTS 
The goal of the proliferator is to acquire 1 SQ 
equivalent of either uranium or plutonium. The four 
scenarios identified in Table 1 are transformed to a 
Markov chain model, taking into account mass flows 
(both normal and diversion or theft) and intrinsic and 
extrinsic barriers to proliferation. The success probability 
and the corresponding proliferation risk are shown and 
compared in Figure 1 for plutonium proliferation. The 
trends for uranium proliferation are 
similar. 
Fig. 1. Comparison of success probability and risk of Pu 
proliferation. 
On a relative basis, proliferation concerns measured 
in terms of both proliferation success probability and 
proliferation risk suggest that (1) a fuel lease scheme is 
more proliferation resistant than without fuel lease; (2) 
generally a closed fuel cycle is more proliferation 
resistant than an open fuel cycle but this may change if 
Type 2 states have large inventories of plutonium &om 
the PUREX recycling process. 
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